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then deduce existence theorems for asset markets without short-selling
and for the CAPM.
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INTRODUCTION
1
The CAPM model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) has been the
first model of equilíbrium with consumption sets unbounded below. While
the implications of the model (the "mutual fund" result and the "beta
law") were widely used in finance, the problem of existence of an
equilibrium itself was ignored. Existence results were obtained only a
few years ago by Nielsen (1990a,b) and Allingham (1991).
The fírst finite dimension equilibrium existence result when
consumption sets are unbounded below was proven by Hart (1974) under the
assumption that agents' utility functions were Von-Neumann Morgenstern
and that theír directions of improvement were "positively
semí-independent". Much later Werner (1987) and Nielsen (1989)
reconsidered the problem. Werner gave an existence result based on a
generalisation of Gale-Nikaido-Debreu's lemma under the assumptfon that
there was at least one price for which there was "absence of arbitrage
opportunity" for all agents. Nielsen who makes fairly weak hypotheses on
preferences obtains a very general result under the assumption that
agents' directions of improvement were "positively semi-independent".
In the infinite dimension case, two existence results based on
Negishi's method were given by Cheng (1991) and Brown and Werner (1993)
and applied to subspaces of Lp and Von-Neumann Morgenstern utilíties.
In this paper, ue extend the results of Cheng, Brown and Werner in
the following sense : we do not assume that each agent's preferred sets
have a uniform direction of improvement nor do we assume the continuity
of utílity functions. We only assume that the preferred sets of
attainable allocations have non-empty interiors.
We first deduce from our result an existence theorem when the
consumptíon sets are the posítive orthant of a locally convex solid
Riesz space. This result improves theorem 10.1 of Mas-Colell and 2ame
(1991). We make a local non-satiation assumption instead of an uniform
directíon of ímprovement assumption for the attainable allocations.3
This assumption can be viewed as a weaker form of the F-properness
condition in Mas-Colell and Zame.
41e then get existence theorems for the C.A.P.M with an infinite
number of assets wíth or wíthout a riskless asset.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 1, we present the
model and its assumptions. In section 2, we give some críteria for the
closedness and boundedness assumptions. The main result and its proof
are given ín section 3. Section 4 and 5 are devoted to applications,
an equilibrium without short-selling and the C.A.P.M.
1. TE~ MODEL
we consider an exchange economy with commodity space E. The space E
ís assumed to be a locally convex topological vector space. There are m
consumers. Each consumer 1 is descríbed by a consumption set Xi c E, an
initial endowment ei and a preference relation which Ss represented by a
m
utility function ui : X1 -~ R. Let e- E eí be the total endowment. An
i-1
allocation is a m-tuple x-(xl,...,xm) with xi e X1, Vi. It is
m
attainable if E xi - e. It is indivldually ratlonal attainable if ít
i-1
is attainable and íf ui(xi) a ui(ei), tli. Let A denote the set of all
individually rational attainable allocations. We normalíze the utility
functions by requiring ui(eí) - 0, Wi.
An allocation x is weakly-optimal (N.O) if x e A and if there does
not exist another x'e A such that ui(xi) ~ ui(xi) for every i. We denote
by F the set of weakly-optimal allocations. x is Pareto-optimal (P.0) if
x e A and íf there exists no x' e A such that uí(x~) z ui(xí), Vi, and
u~(x~) ~ u3(xs) for some j. The utility set U is defined as follows :
U-((zl,...,zm) e Rm I 3 xe A s.t. ui(xi) a zi, di T
.4
For xi E Xi, define the preferred-set of xi :
Pi(XS) -{ Xi E Xi I ui(X1) ~ ui(Xi)~ .
xi is a satiation-polnt of Xi if Pi(xi) -~.
Let E' denote the topological dual of E. A quasi-equilibrlum is a
couple (x,p) such that :
1) xEA , pEE'`{p} ;
11) PXS - Pei. Vi :
iii) ui(xi) ~ ui(xi) -~ pxi a pei.
An equilibrlum is a couple (x,p) which satisfies í),ii) and
Sií bis) ui(xi) ~ ui(xi) -~ pxi ~ pei.
It is well-known that a quasi-equilibrium (x,p) is an equilibrium
if Vi, pxi ~ inf pXi.
TLe assumotions
Ne make the folloxing assumptions :
H1 : X1 is closed, convex, non-empty for every i- 1,...,m.
H2 : ei E Xi, Vl.
H3 : ui is strictly quasi-concave, Vi.
H4 : U is closed.
HS : U ís bounded.
H6 : If x-(xl,...,xm) E A then dí, int P1(xi) s~.
2. CRITERIA FOR CLOSEDNESS AND BOUNDEDNESS OF U
Let us recall that HS is verífied if, Vi, Xi is the positive
orthant of a topological lattíce.m m
AW -{ x E II Xi I xi E Wi, Vi and ï x1 - O}.
i-1 i-1
m
If A~ x{0} and if x E Am and x x 0, then pxi ~ 0, Vi wíth p E n Si,
i-1
m
contradicting E xi - 0. Thus Am - {0} and A i s compact. Since ui is
i-1
continuous for every i, U is compact.
ii) Conversely, assume that U is closed and bounded. Let a belong
to the unit-simplex of Rm with aci ~ 0, di. Let u be a solution to
max { E aizi ; z E U}. There exists x e A such that di, ui - ui(xi). Hence,
i
„ m m „
there does not exist x E II Wi with E xi - 0, and
i-1 i-1
m m
E- Wi is closed, contains no line and ( n-WO)0 - E- Wi .
1-1 i-1 i-1
Therefore n- WD has a non
i-1
Let us make some additional remarks :
empty interior. Equivalently n Si :~.
i-1
a
a) We say that p is "viable" for agent i if his demand at p exists.
It may easily be proven that if E-Rl, p ís "viable" for agent i iff
p E Si.H
m
Thus the hypothesis n Si x m is equivalent to the existence of a
i-1
price which is viable for every agent.
b) We recall that the notion of absence of free lunch is more
restrictíve than the notion of arbitrage free. Indeed if p E RL admits
no free lunch for agent i then it is arbitrage free for this agent (see
Brown and Werner, 1993, proposition 1).
c) The hypothesis which is hard to verify is H4. We quote two
results.
Proposltlon 5- (Chichilnisky-Heal, 1993). Assume that E is a reflexive
Banach space and Xi - E, Vi. Assume moreover :
a) A is norm bounded,
b) ui is norm continuous and concave.
Then H4 and HS are fulfilled.
Proof - Obviously, HS is satisfied. We prove that H4 holds. Let {zn} e U
converge to z. There exists xn e A such that ui(xi) ~ zi, Vi. Since A is
convex, norm closed and norm bounded, it is weakly compact. Since ui is
norm-continuous and concave, it is weakly upper semi-contínuous. Thus
there exists a converging subsequence x~ ~-~ x and ui(xi) a
1'im ui(x~ ) z zi, Vi. Thus z e U.
a
Proposition 6 - (Cheng, 1991). Assume :
a) Xi - Lpfp), Vi where ~a is a finite measure and 1 s p s m,9
b) tli, ui(x) -
J
Uí(x(s))dp(s) wlth Ui . R-~ R, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and
~ Ui(x(s))dp(s) e R, tlx e Lp(p)
Then U verifies H4 and HS.
Proof - It follows from proposition 2 and example 1 that HS holds. The
proof of H4 which is long and delicate can be found in Cheng (1991).
Under the above hypotheses Cheng (1991) also shous that if for at
least one agent i, lim 8Ui(x) ~ t m, then A is not p-norm bounded. So
x-~-m
that in that case the hypothesis a) of proposition 5 is not fulfilled.
3. TEIEOREM 1
Assume H1,..., H6. Then there exists a quasi-equilibrium.
Proof
This will be done in several steps. Throughout thís section we
assume that e- (el,...,em) is not weakly-optimal. This assumption is
not restrictive since if e is W.O. then there exists p e E'~ {0} such
that (e,p) is a quasi-equilibrium (see e.g. Cheng, 1991).
Lemma 1 - Assume H4, HS. Then U is compact, convex with non
empty-ínterior.
Proof - It is obviously convex, compact. Its interior is non-empty since
e is not W.O.
a
0lo
Let A be the unit-simplex of Rm, i.e,
( m
A-{ SER~ I E S. - 1},
l i-1 i
and let f: G-~ R4 be defined by
s E A-~ f(s) - max {a E Rf~as E U}.
Since U has a non-empty interior, f(s) ~ 0 for every s E A.
Lemma 2- Assume H1,...,HS. If x E A and if there exists an s E A such that
ui(xi) e f(s)si, tli, then x is weakly-optimal.
Conversely, for every s E A, there exists an x E A such that ui(xi) '-
f(s)si, dí.
Proof - Obvious.
By Lemma 2, one can define
s E A-~ H(s) -{x E A I ui(xi) e f(s)si, tli}.
Lemma 3 - Assume H4, H5, then f is continuous.
Proof - Let sn e ~-~ s and f(sn) -~ a. Since U is closed, as e U, and
hence, a s f(s). Assume a ~ f(s). From Lemma 1, there exists W e U with
Wi ~ 0, tli.
Define : W~ -(1-~)f(s)s t~W, for ~ E 10,1[.
For ~ sufficiently close to 0, one has
asi ~ Wi, tli,
and therefore f(sn)si ~ Wi, Vi, for n sufficiently large. Since W~ e U
we have a contradiction with the definition of f(sn).
0
011
Remark 1- The proof of Lemma 3 does not require the continuity of the
utílity functions ui as in Cheng (1991). One can also observe that Lemma
3 is true if U is compact, convex, comprehensive, i.e.,
V E U and 0 S V' S V-~ V' E U,
and if U contains an element N with Wi ~ 0, Vi.
Lemma 4 - There exist a convex symmetric open set V of E, an integer k,
m finite sets of k elements of E, (Ni,...,i~} vith i-1,...,m, k
elements xi, ..,xk of A and k open sets of A, U1, ..,Uk Which cover G,
such that :
VS E A, s E U~ -~ V1, ui(Xi t i'~i t Z) ~ f(s)si, VZ E V.
Proof - Let s E A and xs E H(s). From H6, Vi, there exists vi E E such that :
ui(xi t vi) ~ ui(xi) z f(s)si.
Since f is continuous, Vi, there exists an open neigborhood Ui of s in
A such that :
ui(xi 4 vi) ~ f(s')si, Vs' E Ui .
Let s" E A, x"s E A be such that :
ui(x~s) a f(s")si - max (ffs')si~ s' E Ui }.
From H6, Vi, there exist a vï and a convex symmetric open set Vi such
that :
s s
ui(xis t vi t z) ~ ui(xïs) '- f(s')si, Vz E Vi, ds' E Ui12
m
Define Us - n Ui
í-1
and di, vis by xi t vis - xis t vi .
Then we have :
Vi, ui(xi t vis t z) ~ f(s')si, tlz E Vi, ds' E Us.
Let {Usl, ..,Usk} be an open covering of A. One has :
tls E A, S E Usj -~ ui (xi`) t Visj t Z) ~ f(s)si , VZ E Vij .
Define for every i :
s





and note : xi - xi~
s
Uj - U j, Vi, Vj.
Then :
VS E 0, S E Uj -~ Vi, Ui(Xi t Wi t Z) ~ f(s)Si, VZ E V.
Next, define for s E A and for j- 1,...,k, such that s E U~ .
Wj(s) - S Wi, and
í
0
P(s) -{p E E'~~pz~ ~ i, Vz E mV,pW~(s) ~ 1, `dj such that s e U~13
Lemma 5
i) Vs e A, P(s) is convex, c(E',E) - compact and non-empty.
ii) Vs e A, 3 p e P(s) such that :
tlx. ui(xí) ~ f(s) si. tli - 1,..., m-~ p E xi z pe.
i
Proof - Let s e A. Define :
Ví, ai(s) -{x e Xí ~ ui(x) ~ f(s)si},
and G(s) - E ní(s) - e.
i
From Lemma 4, ui(xi t Wi t z) ~ f(s)sí, Vz e V, and tlj such that
s e U~. Hence, for j such that s e U~, Wj(s) t m V c G(s).
From the very definition of f, 0 E G(s). Thus, there exists p e E'`{p}
such that :
p E zí ~ pe, tlz wfth ui(zí) z f(s)si,tli.
i
Let x with ui(xi) z f(s)si, tli,and let I-{i Ixí is not a satiation-point}.
For i e I, from H3, there exists vi(xi) such that :
Va e 10,1(, ui(xí t a vi(xí)) ~ f(s)sí.
From Lemma 2, there exísts y e A verifying ui(yí) ~ f(s)si, Vi, and
from H6, yí is not a satiation-point for any i. Hence, for i e I,
ui(xi) ~ ui(Yi) ~ f(s)si.
Define xi - xi t a vi(xi) for i e I,
xí - xi for i E I.
Then E xi - e E G(s), and therefore
i14
p i xi t a i p. vi(xi) z pe.
i ieI
Letting a-~ 0 we obtain p E xi z pe, and statement ii) has been
1
proved.
Since, dj, Wj(s) t m V c G(s), we have :
tlj, pWj(s) ~ 0 and I pz ( s p Wj(s), Vz e m V.
Let j0 verify pWJD(s) - min p.Wj(s). We have
j
I p . z I s 1 S p . Wj(s), Vz e m V.
pWjD(s) pW,D(s)
Thus, p'- pj belongs to P(s), i.e, P(s) is non-empty.It is
pW ~(s)
compact by Alaoglu's theorem. Obviously P(s) is convex.
Defíne P(s) -{P e P(s) ~ uí(xi) a f(s) si, Vi -~ p E xi ~ pe}.
i
Lemma 6
Vp E P(s), Vi, Vxi e Xi, ui(xi) ~ f(s)si -~ pxi ~ pxi, Vxs e H(s).
In particular : di, ui(xi) z ui(xí) with xs E H(s) -~ pxi ~ pxi.
015
Proof - Let xi e Xi with ui(xi) z f(s)sí, and let xs E H(s). Define :
x' - x~ , d~ x 1,
xi - xí .
Let p e P(s). Then p~ xs - pe á p~ x~ , and hence , px1 a pxi.
Let s e A, xs e H(s), and defíne :
~(s) -{(yí....,ym) e Rm I yi - P(ei - xi). di, with p e P(s) ).
Lemma 7
(1) m is convex uniformly twunded valued.
(ii) ~ has a closed graph.
Proof - (i) P(s) is convex since P(s) i s convex and therefore ~(s) is
convex.
Now, Vi, let x1 e X1 such that uí(xi) a max {uí I(u1,...,um) E U}.
From Lemma 6, pxi ~ pxi , V1, dp e P(s). Since pe - E p xi, we have :
i
pxi -Pe- E px~ ape-p. E x~ zB
jxi jxi
since p e P(s) which is Q(E',E)-compact.
s
Then Ip(ei-xí1 I`- IP . ei~ t Ip . xi ~
5 max { ~ p.eí~ t Ip . xi~ } t B.
pEP(s)16
(11) Let y- 1Lm yn, s- lím sn with yn E m(sn), Vn. We have
pn e P(sn) c P(sn). For n sufficiently large, sn E U~ for every j such
that s e U~.
In other words, pn E P(s) for n large enough. Hence pn P~ p e P(s).
From H6 and H3, there exists ví(xi) such that :
Va e)0,1[, ui(xi t avi(xí)) ~ ui(xi) ' - f(s)si, Vi.
The function f being continuous, we derive that
ui(xi t aví(xi)) ~ f(sn)si, Vi, dn large enough.
s
From lemma 6, pn(xs t avi(xi)) ~ pnxin - pnei -
and p(xí t a vi(xi)) ~ pei -
n
yi '
Let a-~ 0. This gives : pxi ~ pei - yi . Since E xi - e and E yi - 0,
i i
we have, Vi, pxi - pei - yi
We now prove that p e P(s).
Let x with ui(xi) '- f(s)si, di, and
let I-{i ~ xi is not a satiation-point }.
For i e I, from H3, there exists vi(xi) such that Va e)0,1(,
ui(xi t avi(xi)) ~ f(s)si.From Lemma 2, [here exists x' E A such that,
ui(xi) a f(s)si, Vi.
From H6, xi is not a satiation-point for any i. In particular,
i E I-~ ul(xl) ~ ui(xi) z f(s)si.
Since f is continuous, for every n large enough,
ui(xi ~ a v(xi)) ~ f(sn)si, Vi E I,
and ui(xi) ~ f(sn)si, Ví E I.
Since p E P(sn) we have n
m
pn E xi t a E pn.vi(xi) a pne,
i-1 1E1
m




Hence p E xi ~ pe .
i-1
Final step
Fírst we verify that m fulfills the boundary condítlons. Indeed,
si - 0-~ Cls)sí - 0- ul(ei).
Thus, Crom Lemma 6, pei z pxi -~ yi '- 0.1 }i
'fherclore, Irum Ih~r yenera112ed Kakul,,rni Lheurr~m, t.herc exlsts s e A
wlth O e m( s), l.e., Lhere exlsts
p e P(s), xs E A veritying : p xi - peí, Vi,
and uí(xí) z ui(xi) -~ p xi '- p xi.
In other words, ( x,p) is a quasi-equilibrium.
a
4. APPLICATION 1: EQUILIBRIl1M NITHOUT SHORT-SELLING
In thís section the commodity space E is a topological locally
convex-solid Riesz space. Its positive orthant Et is closed and convex.
For x E Et, we define :
I(x) - (y E P ~ ~y~ s ax for some a~ 0}.
IC x ls strlctly posl[Ive then I(x) is dense in F Isee Aliprantis.
Brown and Burkinshaw, 1989). We make the Collowing assumptions :
A1 : Vi, Xi - Et ;
A2 : ei E E;, di ;
e- E eí is strictly posítíve ;
i
A3 : Vi, ui is strtctly quasi-concave and continuous from Et into R;
A4 : U is closed ;
AS : U is bounded ;
A6 : If x-(xl,...,xm) e A, then, tor every i, t.herc rzist an r,p~.n
neigborhood of 0, Ni, and a vector vi such that :
I(v.) - I(e) and
i
dx E 10,11, ui(xi i L(vi . z)) ~ ui(x) if z e 41i and if xi t a(vi ~ z) E[:r.Remark 2
i) In asswoption A6, the condition I(vi) - I(e) is equívalent to :
there exíst x ~ 0, {~ ~ 0 such that ice ~ vi ~ Aé. If int Et s m, and if
ví and e are strictly positive than this condition is satisfied since
I(e) - I(vi) ~ E.
ii) Consider the second statement of assumption A6. This condition
is weaker than the F-properness mentioned in Mas-Colell-2ame (1991). One
can also observe that, since ui is strictly quasi-concave, this condition
is the reformulation of assumption H6 (non-satiation) of Theorem 1 when
int E} is empty.
Theorem 2
Assume A1,...,A6. There exists a quasí-equllibrium.
Proof - It will be done in two steps.
Step 1- we shall prove there exists a quasi-equilibrium for the economy
with I(e) as commodity space. The consumptíon set for an agent i is
It(e) - E}ni(e). The set of indtvidually rational attainable allocations
of this economy is equal to A, and hence the utility set is U. Thus,
assumptions H1,...,HS of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
Let us check now assumptíon H6 of Theorem 1. we shall endow I(e)
with the following norm :
Ilxllé - ínf { A~ 0 ~ ~xl s xe ).zo
Since E is solid, every neigborhood of 0(with the initial
topology) in E contains a neigborhood of 0 in I(e) (with the norm ~I II-). e
Consider the open set W. of assumption A6. From the remark above i
there exists an open neighborhood of 0 in I(e), Vi, which is contained
in Wi.Since I(vi) - I(e), one can choose Vi such that vi t Vi c(ae,{~e]
for some x~ 0, {~ ~ 0, and therefore : xi t vi t z e E}, Vz e Vi. Hence,
H6 of Theorem 1 is verified.
One concludes there exists a quasi-equilibrium (x`,p`) of the
economy with I(e) as commodity space and p' e I(e)' (the dual of I(e)
with the norm ~I Ilé).
SLep 2 - We shall prove that p' is continuous in the initial topology
and has an extension p e E' such that ( x', p) is a quasi-equilibrium for
the initial economy.
Denote by Wi, vÍ the open sets and the vectors associated with x'
by assumption A6.
Since, ui(xi t vi t z) a ui(x~), Vz e V1 (Vi is defined abovel, we
~
have
p'(vi t z) ~ 0, Vz E Vi ,
and hence p` vi ~ 0.
Normalize p` by p' i vi - i.
i
Without loss of generality, assume Wi symmetric and solid. Let
m
W' - n Wi. We have just to prove that p' is bounded on W` n I}(e).
i-1
Let y E W' n I}(e). There exísts x~ 1 such that 0~ y s A e.
Define z- ~ y s e- E xi.
izl
One has : i xi - z }~ ~ vi n 0,
since vi is strictly positive (I(vl) - I(e), e strictly positive -~ vi
strictly positive ; see Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw, 1989).
By the Riesz deco~pasition, there exists (zl,...,zm) verifyi:~
Ezi -z.
i
0 5 zi s xi t~ vi, Vi.
Since 0 5 zi s z-~ y e~ W' , and W' is solid, one has zi e~ N', Vi.
From A6 : ui(xi i~(vi - x zi)) ~ ui(xi), Fli ;
and 1- p' E vi z p" y.
i
Ne have proved that p' is continuous on I(e) with the initial
topology.
Since I(e) is dense in E, p` has a unique extension p e E'.
Since E- I(e) -( x E E ~ ~x~ A n e-~ ~xl }, and ui is
continuous on E},if x' e E} and ui(x') ~ ui(xi), one has x' A n e-~ x'
and hence, for n large enough ui(x' A n e) ~ ui(xi). Therefore,
p(x' Ane) ~pxi andpxi~pxi-pei.
In other words, (x',p) is a quasi-equilibrium.
az2
5. APPLICATION Z : C.A.P.M.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the CAPM played a very
important role in the finance literature although the problem of
equilibrium exístence was only discussed rather recently by Allingham
(1991), Nielsen (1990a, 1990b).
In the next paragraph, we show that the "mutual fund" result and
the "beta law" are only necessary conditlons for equilibrium. They are
however important relations from an equilibrium point of view because
they may be used to bring down an infinite dimensional equilibrium
problem to a two dimensional one.
5.1. The model
There are S states of the world. A v-field .y models agents common
information on the set S of states of the world and P is either an
objective probability or agent's common subjective probability on (S,Y).
The economy E is described as follows. There is only one good taken
as numéraire tradable at every state s.
There are n agents. Agent i is described by a consumption space X.
i
S L2(P) (we do not assume here that Xi is finite dimensional), an
endowment el and a utility function uí : Xi -~ R assumed to be "mean
variance", in other words, there exists Ui : R x Rt-~ R such that ui(z)
- Ui(E(z),var(z)), z e Xi where E(z) and var(z) denote the expectation
and variance of z.
We make the following assumptions :
B1 X. - Z, b'i, where Z is a closed subspace of Lz(f'1 i
n
B2 eí e Z, E(ei) ~ 0, Vi. e- E ei is not a constant, E(e) - 1,
i-1
Var(e)-1 ,23
B3 di, Ui is strictly concave, C2, Ui(.,y) is increasing dy e R},
while Ui(x,.) i s decreasing dx e R;
B4 1 e Z (there exists a riskless asset).
As Z is a closed subspace of L2(P), an asset price iO being a
continuous linear form is identified by Riesz representation theorem
with aa element of 2. 11e denote by ~x,y~ the dot product of x and y in
Z. Given a price ~, the budget set of an agent i is defíned by
Bi(~p) -{ci E L2(P) s.t. 3z e Z ; ~~p,z~ 5 0, ci - eitzJ.
Equivalenltly,
gi(r~) -~ci E Z, ~ rp,ci~ s ~~p,ei~~.
Definttion - An equilibrium is a pair (c,~p) e Zn x 2 with
c - (cl,...,cn) such that
a) ci maximizes ui(ci) subject to ci e Bi(~p), for every í-1,...n,
b) En-1 ci - e.
4ie first remark that the mutual fund result and the beta law are
necessary conditions for equilibrium.
Let H denote the span of 1 and e.
Proposition 7- If (c,p) is an equilibrium, then ~p e H and c e Hn. More
precisely, there exist ( a,al,...,an) e R}}1 and (b,bl,...,bn) e Rntl
such that (') ~p --ae t b, and (" ) ci - aie t bi for every
i-1,...,n.
Proof - Let ci(~p) denote agent's i demand at price ~p, being the solution
to the problem :24
max U1(E(zl,var(-r.)) sub~ect to
z E Z. ~~p,z~ s ~p,ei~.
It exists iff there exists a multiplíer pi e Rt such that
aii t 2 bi(ci(N) - E(ci(rp))1) - F~iN and
F~i(~N.ci(~p)~ - ~~p.ei~) - 0.
where ai-Ui1(E(cí(~p)),var(ci(~P))) and bi - Ui2(E(ci(W)),var(cí(~P))).
Thus ci(~p) - aí 1- ti ~p with ti E Rt.
At equílíbrium Ei-1 ci(~p) - e. Therefore summing up over agents,
(ïi-1 ti) W - - E } ~-1 Ai .
Under B2 since e is not a constant, we may write
~p--ae f b, aeRt, beR,
ci - ai e t bi, aie Rt,bi e R for every 1-1,...,n,
xhich proves the claim. As it is well known (~') is a mutual fund result
and (') is a version of the beta law.
It follows from proposition 7 that if (c,~p) is an equilibrium, then
~p e H and ci - ai e t bi for every i- 1,...,n with (ai, bi) solution of
max Ui(a t b, aZ)
~ W. a F t b~`- ~~p. Ei~
and Ei-1 ai - 1, Ei-1 bi-0.zs
5.2. Existence Qf eauilibrium when there exis ~ rískless asset
From the previous section it follows that we need only consider
prices in H and that we may substitute for the original economy, the
economy ó which has the same equilibria, and is described by the list :
S s{X, ui : X c H-~ R, ei, 1-1,...n} where
X- { a e} b~ a e R, b e R}, ui(a e t b) - Ui(atb,a2) and ei is the
projection of ti on H, in other words ei - ai e } bi wíth
ai - cov(e,ei), b1- E(ei) - ai.
Let (p1,p2) denote the price of e and 1, i.e. pi -~~,c~,
p2 - t ~p,l~. An equilibrium is now a quadruple (a', b', pi, p2) e R} x Rn
x R x Rt with a' -(ai,...,an), b' -(bi,...,bn) such that
a) (ai,bi) maximizes Uifatb,a2) subject to
pi a} p2 b s pi ai } p2
bi for every i-1,...,n,
b) 51-1 ai - 1, Ei-1 bi - 0.
Since Ui is increasing in b, p2 ~ 0 and we may normalize prices so
that p2-1. Obviously, it is easier to work in the space of expectations
and variances. Let us therefore make the change of coordinates
x- a t b, y- a, q--p1 t 1. Finally let Vi : R x R-~ R be defined
by Vi(x,y) - U1(x,y2). For every i-1,...,n, Vi is strictly concave and
C2 and Viy(x,0) - 0 for every x.
Lle may redefine an equilibrium as follows. Let xi - E(ei),
yi- cov(e,ei) for every i-1,...,n. M equilibrium is then a triple (x`.y'.q')
E Rnx Rn x R with x' -( x', .. x'), y' -(Y' y') such that
~ 1 ' n 1' ' n26
a) (xí,yí) maximizes Vi(x,y) sub~ect to
x- q'y 5 Xi - q'yi for every i-1,...,n,
b) Ei-1 xi - 1. ~-1 yi - 1.
In other words (x',y',q`) is the equilibrium of a two dimensional
economy Y2 with consumption space R2, agent's i utility Vi(x,y) and
agent's i endowment xi - E(ei) and yi - cov(e,ei).
Next we define the set of individually rational allocations ad of
the reduced economy ~ by :
( n n l
d-{(x..Y-)n I E x. - 1. E y. - 1, V.(x..Y.) '- V.(x y ),Vi } l i i i-1 i-1 i i-1 i i i i i i' i 111
If
(xi'yi)i-1
E ,1 we have












As E x - E x. - 1, we have
i-1 1 i-1 1
n Ui2(xi.Yi) -2 n UiZ(xi.y2) z
~~ E y - E y
i-1 Uii(xi,Yi) i i-1 Uii(xi,yi) 1Therefore yi 5 Ai, Vi for some Ai ~ 0.
From (ii), we also get :
-2
xi L Xi 4 Uí2(xi,Y2) Yi di, since UiZ(xi,Yi) ~ 0.
Ui1(xi.Yi)
n
Via E xi - 1, xi is also bounded above for every i.
1-1
Thus ,d is bounded. Since Vi is continuous, ,~ is compact and so is
the utility set of ~. Hence assumptions H4 and HS of theorem 1 are
fulfilled for the reduced economy. H6 is obviously satisfied since
there is no satiation point. We have therefore :
Theorem 3 - Under assumptions B1, B2, B3, B4, there exists an
equilibríum.
5.3. Existence of eauilibrium wit out ~ riskless asset
In this section we assume
64 Bis : 1 E Z(There doesn't exist a riskless asset).
Let n denote the projection of 1 on Z. Ne replace B2 by
B2 Bis . ei e Z, E(ei) ~ 0 Vi ;
n
e- E ei is not proportional to ~. E(e) - i.
i-1
Let us first remark the following :
Proposition 8 - Agent's i utility has a satiation point si - tin for ti~ 0.
Proof - Uí(E(z),var(z)) being concave, has a maximum iff
aip f 2bi(si - E(si)n) - 0 with ai - Uil(E(si),var(si)) and28
bi - Uíz(E(si),var(si)). Thus sí is a satiation point iff there exists a
t such that si - tn and the function t-~ Ui(tE(n),var(tn)) has a
maximum. Since Ui is concave,
Ui(tE(n),var(tn)) 5 Ui(0,0) t tE(n)Uii(0,0) t t2 var(n)Ui2(0,0).
Thus, Ui(tE(n),var(tn)) -~ -m as t-~ tm, since U12(0,0) ~ 0. Therefore
U.(tE(n),var(tn)) has a maximum.
i
Since its derivative at t-0 equals E(n)Uii(0,0) ~ 0, the maximum
is reached at a tí ~ 0.
Let H' denote the span of n and e. Using the same proof as in
proposition 7, while replacing ~l,cí~ by ~n,ci~, one gets a mutual fund
result and a beta law :
Proposition 9- If (c,~p) is an equilibrium, then ~p e H' and c e H'n. More
precisely, there exist (a,ai,...,an) E Rt}1 and (b,bl,...,bn) e Rntl
such that ( ') ~p -- ae t bn and (" ) ci - aie t bin, Vi.
It follows that if (c',~p') is an equilibrium, then ~p' e H'.
Furthermore,
ci - aie i bin for every i- 1,...,n with (ai,bi) solution of
max Ui(atbE(n),var(aetbn)) such that
c~p',aetbn~ ~ c ~p~,ei~ - ~ ~p~,ei~
where ei is the projection of ei on H' and ii ai - 1, i~-1 bi - 0.
Thus, we need only consider prices in H' and we may substitute for the
original economy the economy ó ', whích has the same equilibria, and is
described by the list :
~' -{X, ui : X c H' -~ R, ei, i-1,...,n} where
X-{aetbnl a E R, b e R}, ui(a,b) - Ui(atbÈ(n),var(aetbn)) and
e. - a.e t b.n- i i i29
Let (pl,p2) denote the price of e and n, i.e. pl - ~~,e~,
PZ - ~~,n~.
and
M equilibrium is a quadruple (a`,b',pi,p2) e R} x Rn x R x R
with a'-(ai ,..,an), b'-(bi,...,bn) such that
a) (a?, bf) maximizes U1(a t bE(n),var(ae t bn)) subject to
pia ~ pZb s piai t pZbi for every 1-1,..., n,
~ r b) i-1 ai - 1, i-1 bi - 0.
Let us now show that the utility set of ó' is compact. Indeed, since
Ui is concave
Ui(0,0) - ui(a,b) ~-(a t bE(n))Uil(o,0) - var(ae t bn)Ui2(0,0).
Let M- Ui(0,0) - ui(ei). Then
{(a,b)~ ui(a,b) ~ ui(ei)} S{(a,b) I M a-(a t bE(n))Uil(0,0)
- var(ae t bn)Ui2(0,0)}.
Tedious computation of var(ae 4 bn) and the negativity of Uiz(0,0)
show that this last set is bounded. Let ~' denote the set of
individually rational allocations :
n n
~' -{(ai,bi)i-1 ~ E ai-1, E bi-0, ui(ai,bi) a ui(ei), tli }.
i-1 i-1
Thus ~' is compact and again it follows that the utility set of l;'
is compact which takes care of assumptions H4 and H5.
In the spirit of Nielsen [1990b), we add two more assumptions in
order to get H6 :30
BS : ui(ei) ~ Ui(0,0)
( y Ui2(1'y) 1 1-E(n)
B6 : max {-
Uil(1'y) }~ 2 with Y- E(t1) ~
Remark - Nielsen assumes that ui(ei) ~ Ui(0,0). Let us show that BS is a
less strong assumption. Indeed by definition, ei - eif Ci where lí e H'l.
Since ei is the projection of ei on H', E(ei) - ~l,ei~ -~n'ei~ -
~p,ei~ - ~l,ei~ - E(ei). Thus E(fi) - 0 and cov (ei,li) - ~eí.li~ -
E(Ci)E(ei) - 0. Therefore, var(ei) - var(ei) ; var(li) ~ var(ei), and
ui(ei) - Ui(E(ei),var(ei))- Ui(E(ei),var(ei)) ~ Ui(E(ei),var(ei)) - ui(ei).
Assume B5. If (ai'bi)i-1 E ,rl', then
Ui(aitbiE(~I),var(aie t bin)) a ui(ei) ~ Ui(0,0).
Therefore ai t bíE(n) ~ 0, Vi.
n
Since E (ai t biE(n)) - 1, we have 0 ~ ai t biE(p) ~ 1.
i-1
Next, we show that B6 implies that E(tin) - tiE(n) ~ 1, with ti~ a
satiation-point.
Indeed, B6 is equivalent to
E(n) U(1, var(n))t Z var(n) U(1, var(n)) ~ 0, di,
11 E(n)2 E(n) i2 E(n)2
since var(n) - E(n)(1-E(n)).
This implies that at t- E~j , the function Ui(tE(n), t2var(n)) is
increasing. Thus t. ~ 1 .
i Rj
Consequently, if (ai,bl)n-1 e a4', then aie t bin ~ tin, di, which
implies that H6 is fulfilled.
Theorem 4 - Under B1, 62 bis, B3, B4 bis, BS and B6 there exists an
equilibrium.31
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